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Introduction 
 
The worldwide increase in equity prices in recent years has often been linked to accelerating labour 
productivity, which has in turn been related to the information technology (IT) revolution (see the 
discussion in Campbell and Shiller, 2001, Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999, Keon, 1998, Hall, 
2001, IMF, 2000).  It has been argued that the apparent acceleration2 in labour productivity is an 
accurate indicator of increases in firms’ current and expected real cash flow and thus dividends, and 
its acceleration has thereby contributed to an increase in the value of firms.  
 
Despite the attention that has been drawn to effects of the ‘new economy’ on share prices, very little 
research has been undertaken to examine the relationship between productivity and firms’ cash 
flow, and whether the recent acceleration in firms’ cash flow is sustainable.  Rather, it is often 
asserted that the IT revolution has sparked the recent acceleration in labour productivity, boosting 
future productivity, and that the higher growth in labour productivity is sustainable and boosts 
future cash-flow, thus justifying high equity valuations. 
 
This paper queries both premises of the argument - that labour productivity proxies firms’ cash flow 
and that a high productivity growth rate is sustainable.  It is argued that the more relevant 
productivity measure for the remuneration of capital, and hence a key element for proxying firms’ 
cash flow, is the marginal productivity of capital, which under certain assumptions is equivalent to 
capital productivity at a macro level. Other productivity proxies for firm’s cash flow such as labour 
productivity, potential output and total factor productivity (TFP), may be misleading.  
 
It is also argued that if one accepts the presupposition of diminishing returns to capital and an 
important role for capital productivity in determining earnings, then the IT revolution will have 
largely temporary effects on the growth in firms’ cash flow. If the current high levels of share prices 
are not justified by such long run fundamentals, one is left with largely one-off or temporary factors 
to explain them. These include a decrease in the risk premium, higher international liquidity, baby 
boomers, the disinflation, irrational exuberance, a fall in the relative price of capital goods, a rise in 
the capital share of GDP and increased leverage (IMF, 2000, Shiller, 2000). 
 
Using historical data over a century for 9 countries (G7, Australia and Denmark) the relationships 
between share prices and various measures of productivity are investigated empirically in the light 
                                                 
2 We note that the data on labour productivity have themselves been subject to revision. 
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of the theoretical discussion. First, simple Granger causality tests are used to examine the bivariate 
relationship between real share returns and productivity growth.  Second, the nexus between real 
share returns and productivity is investigated using a VAR framework where other variables than 
productivity are allowed to influence share returns. The overall conclusion is that capital 
productivity is indeed the measure which is most closely linked to share returns, although even for 
this measure, the close share price-productivity relationship asserted by some “new economy” 
advocates does not seem to be present over a long run of data. 
 
2 Equity prices and the productivity debate  
 
In the last few years, the popular controversy as to whether equity prices accurately reflect their 
fundamental values has, to a large extent, centred on the sustainability of the productivity advances 
in the 1990s. It was argued that unprecedented levels of share prices were justified by an 
acceleration in labour productivity related to the “new economy” and IT (see, e.g. Keon 1998). 
Despite recent falls in share prices and revisions to productivity data, the issue remains relevant at 
the time of writing given that valuation measures remain historically high, as well as to analyse the 
justification of the earlier boom. This section addresses two important issues in this context, namely 
the relevant productivity measure for share prices, and whether the productivity advances in the 
1990s are sustainable. 
 
2.1 Productivity and equity prices 
 
2.1.1 The role of capital productivity 
 
Addressing first the relevant productivity measure for equity prices, the fundamental value of shares 
has widely been derived from the well-known Gordon’s growth model: 
 
 
gr
Dg
Q
-
+
=
)1(
          (1) 
 
where Q is an index of the price of shares that is justified by fundamentals, D is an index of 
aggregate real dividends per share, r is the real required return to equity, and g is a constant 
expected growth rate in real dividends per share.  We suggest that Gordon’s model can usefully be 
rewritten as  
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where MPK is an index of the marginal productivity of capital, v is the payout ratio, K is the capital 
stock, S is the number of shares. 
 
MPK equals earnings per unit of capital under the assumption of perfect competition in the goods 
market and that the capital stock K does not depreciate. Under imperfect competition in the goods 
markets the real return to capital is given by )/11( h-KMP , where h < 0 is the price elasticity of 
demand facing the firm.  
 
In more detail, the marginal productivity of capital is the relevant measure of earnings to capital 
because it reflects the earnings associated with investing in one extra unit of capital.  Consider the 
firm’s profit maximizing problem: 
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where p  is nominal profits, P is the value-added price-deflator, Y is aggregate value-added output, 
K is capital services, W is the wage rate, R is the nominal cost of capital, and L is labour services. 
The first-order condition for profit maximization for the perfect competitive firm is given by 
PRKY // =¶¶ . Hence, in the margin the real return to capital equals the marginal productivity of 
capital. For the imperfectly competitive firm the first order condition for profit maximization is 
given by  
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which says that the return to capital exceed the marginal productivity of capital by the magnitude of 
1)/11( ³- h .  
 
Inclusion of the marginal productivity of capital hence relates to the first order condition of profit 
maximisation where investment takes place up to the point where the real interest rate (or cost of 
capital) i = MPK.  Depreciation changes the first order condition of optimum to KMPi =+ d , so that 
returns to capital have to cover real interests and depreciation costs. To simplify we assume that 
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firms are perfectly competitive across the economy as a whole so that the real return to capital is 
given by MPK 
 
In equation (2) as set out above, total real dividends per share D = MPK * K/S *f; as the capital 
stock divided by the number of shares times the payout ratio scales the rate of marginal productivity 
up to a volume of dividends per share. There is an important question whether the terms other than 
MPK can be omitted. It can be argued that if the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds then the form of 
financing of a firm should be irrelevant to its valuation and any rise in K/S owing, for example, to 
investment of retained earnings would be offset by a fall in f. Hence only MPK  is relevant. 
However, if Modigliani-Miller does not hold, due in particular to external finance constraints and 
tax wedges, then the additional terms could be relevant, with investment of retentions boosting the 
value of the firm (see for example Bodie et al (1999), p538). We note that the growth rate of 
dividends shown in Table 6is actually higher than that of MPK, which gives support to some role for 
terms other than MPK. 
 
Using the same logic the relevant measure of expected growth in dividends g is the growth in the 
marginal productivity of capital plus – depending on the view of Modigliani Miller set out above - a 
term related3 to the growth in the real stock of capital divided by shares in issue times the retention 
rate. 
 
For empirical implementation of this approach, there is a need for a proxy for MPK  at a macro level. 
For this purpose we employ the properties of the well-known Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Under the Cobb-Douglas technology assumption whereby the average product of capital equals the 
marginal product of capital Equation (2) can be written as: 
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where capital productivity Y/K and its growth (in the g term) enter the equation. To allow for the 
interaction between share prices and bond yields, the required return to equity is set equal to the real 
bond yield, rB, and the equity risk premium,d , which inserted into Equation (5) and omitting terms 
in K/S, yields: 
 
                                                 
3 Considerations of diminishing marginal returns to capital will also affect this term. 
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This equation forms the basis for the regression analysis in Section 4.  The equation shows that 
equity returns are positively related to capital productivity and the growth therein, and negatively 
related to the real bond rate and the equity risk premium.  The framework assumes fixed income 
shares as well as a fixed rate of distribution Ã.  The system could be extended to allow for varying 
income shares, payout rates and leverage, however, this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2.1.2 Alternative measures of dividend growth 
 
It has been argued above that the relevant measure of productivity for remuneration of capital and 
hence for determining equity prices is the marginal productivity of capital, which is best proxied by 
capital productivity and not labour productivity, total factor productivity (TFP) or potential output.  
The marginal productivity of labour is relevant for the remuneration of labour and TFP is relevant 
for the remuneration of labour and capital jointly.  However, despite the logic that the marginal 
productivity of capital is the main component of the relevant measure of firm’s earnings potential, 
the literature has consistently focussed on other productivity measures, especially labour 
productivity and potential output.  In IMF (2000), for example, it is argued that the growth in 
potential output can be used as a proxy for expected dividend growth (pp 106-109), and thus may be 
used in empirical implementations of Gordon’s growth model. 4  Kennedy et al (1998) of the OECD 
employ the same method.  The argument is that if income shares remain constant, then the growth 
in earnings will be reflected in output growth. 
 
Elsewhere in IMF (2000), the case is presented that growth in labour productivity can also be the 
relevant measure of earnings growth (Box 3.1 p 140).  Labour productivity growth has also been 
stressed as the relevant measure for share prices in a series of articles by the Economist, for instance 
Economist (2001).  Similarly Campbell and Shiller (2001) note – without endorsing - the argument 
                                                 
4 Since potential output varies over time, the following version of the Gordon growth model, which is suggested by 
Barsky and De Long (1993), is used: 
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where dividend growth is allowed to vary over time.  Note, however, that this equation is invalid since the Gordon 
model is derived under the assumption of constant  growth in dividends. 
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that the high stock market value is often justified by expectations of a continuation of the high 
labour productivity growth in the 1990s, with an underlying premise that labour productivity is the 
relevant productivity measure of earnings.  Finding that price-smoothed-earnings ratio cannot 
predict future labour productivity for the US, they conclude that the high share prices today cannot 
be due to a rational forecast of productivity growth. 
 
To assess the differences between productivity measures in a given technical and economic 
framework, we return to the Cobb-Douglas production function as follows: 
 
aa -= 1KALY .          (7) 
 
Assuming competitive product and factor markets, a is the share of labour in GDP, (1-a) the share 
of capital, and A represents TFP.  Growth in TFP captures changes in organisational efficiency and 
economies of scale as well as technical progress as more normally measured and is often referred to 
as “Hicks neutral” technical progress.  Meanwhile average labour productivity is Y/L, and its growth 
is defined as the change in output per person hour worked.  Similarly, average capital productivity 
is Y/K and its growth is defined as the percentage change in output divided by the non-residential 
capital stock (in terms of both machinery and buildings). Total differentiating Equation (7) yields: 
 
 ALKY lnlnln)1(ln DDaDaD ++-=       (8) 
 
which shows that the growth of output is the sum of the share-weighted growth of inputs and 
growth in TFP.  
 
From Equation (8) it follows that the growth in labour productivity is given by: 
 
 ALKLY ln)/ln()1()/ln( DDaD +-=       (9) 
 
The first right-hand-side term shows capital deepening, whereby an increase in capital per worker 
leads to an increase in workers’ productivity and raises labour productivity in proportion to the 
share of capital.  The other term is TFP, which raises labour productivity on a pro rata basis.  
 
The growth in capital productivity is given by: 
 
 AKLKY ln)/ln()/ln( DDaD +=        (10) 
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From this equation it follows that capital deepening lowers capital productivity while TFP adds to 
it. 
 
Comparing Equations (9) and (10) it is transparent that TFP growth enhances both capital and 
labour productivity.  Capital deepening, however, increases labour productivity (equivalent in the 
Cobb Douglas framework to the marginal productivity of labour) but lowers capital productivity 
(marginal productivity of capital) and therefore explains why the real interest rate tends towards a 
constant mean in the long run while real wages show a continuous rise in the long run.  Indeed, 
subtracting equation (10) from equation (9) gives DlnK/L. From this it follows that changes in 
labour productivity are only equivalent to changes in capit al productivity to the extent that changes 
in TFP dominate changes in capital deepening.  Historically, growth in capital deepening has 
dominated total factor productivity growth. Our calculations suggest that the K/L ratio has increased 
by 3.7% per annum in the OECD countries since 1960, whereas TFP has increased by only 1.8%. 
Over the period from 1990 to 1999 labour productivity increased by 18%, whereas capital 
productivity has remained almost unaltered in the countries considered in this study. 
 
In this context, for the US Oliner and Sichel (2000) have found that capital deepening accounts for 
40% of the rise in labour productivity in the late 1990s and TFP for 60%.  They also concluded that 
two thirds of the acceleration in productivity in the US is accounted for by either the use or the 
production of IT equipment.  Hence, they suggest that the future rates of productivity growth are 
dependent on continuing IT investment.  The overall contribution of computer hardware to 
economic growth was seen as 0.6 percentage points, and the wider concept of information 
processing capital 1.1 percentage points. 
 
The difference between the growth in potential output and capital productivity can be calculated by 
subtracting Equation (10) from Equation (8): 
 
)/ln(lnln)1()/ln(ln LKLKKYY DDaDaDD ++-=-     (11) 
 
ignoring for simplicity cyclical fluctuation in income so that growth in income equals growth in 
potential output.  The difference – equal to the growth of the real capital stock - is unambiguously 
positive since all variables on the right-hand-side of Equation (7) are positive.  The difference was 
34% over the period from 1980 to 1992 and 18% from 1993 to 1999 for the countries used in this 
study.   
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In the light of the above arguments we would contend that it is by no means obvious that the 
measures typically used to proxy g in the Gordon formula are the best available. It has been 
suggested that the correct measure is related to the growth in the marginal productivity of capital, 
which under the Cobb Douglas assumptions equals the growth of capital productivity. We have 
shown that growth in potential output exceeds this aggregate, and for most countries this is also true 
for labour productivity. TFP has occasionally been mentioned as a potential measure of the growth 
in earnings. Using equation (10), if TFP is used to proxy g instead of the measure based on capital 
productivity, then the growth in earnings is measured by capital productivity plus workers’ income 
share times the change in the inverse of the capital labour ratio: aDln(L/K).  This may again be an 
inaccurate measure of g. 
 
The impact of any bias on estimations of the fundamental value of shares can be seen from the 
partial differential of Equation (1): 
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Suppose that r is 8%, as found below, and that g is 2%.  Then the fundamental value of shares is 
biased upward by 25% for each percentage upward bias in g.  This suggests that valuation models 
are highly sensitive to the choice of productivity measure. 
 
We acknowledge that the Cobb-Douglas and Modigliani-Miller assumptions required for an exact 
correspondence between growth in capital productivity and dividend growth are unlikely to hold 
precisely. For this reason, it is essential for empirical analysis to be carried out on the relationship 
of the various productivity measures. Do the actual data support the theoretical arguments presented 
above? Do they give any guidance on the best proxy for g? We return to this issue in Section 4. 
 
2.2 Are the recent productivity advances sustainable? 
 
2.2.1 The recent debate on productivity 
 
The main outcome of this paper is to provide empirical analysis using a long run of data addressing 
the arguments above about the appropriate productivity measure to relate to equity returns. 
However, before turning to the empirical analysis we consider it helpful to also address the 
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sustainability of productivity growth in the light of a technical innovation such as IT, also seen in 
the light of Section 2.1. This is, as noted, the second leg of support for the argument that high levels 
of equity prices may be justified by fundamentals. 
 
Indeed, the recent productivity debate has focussed on the sustainability of the recent acceleration in 
TFP and labour productivity in the US.  Growth in capital productivity has not entered the debate.  
The acceleration in the US productivity growth in the 1990s has also spurred interest in the link 
between productivity and the IT revolution. Almost all analysts agree that the continuous decline in 
quality-adjusted prices of IT has spurred productivity growth.  The benefits of the use of IT are 
more controversial.  Sceptics argue that the surge in economy-wide labour productivity is unrelated 
to the use of IT (Gordon, 1999, 2000, and Kiley, 1999, 2000).  Others have found that the use of IT 
has enhanced labour productivity (Basu et al, 2001, BLS, 2000, CEA, 2000, Jorgenson, 2001, 
Oliner and Sichel, 2000).  
 
Gordon (2000) notes that whereas there were undeniable increases in productivity in the durable 
manufacturing sector, they in his view did not touch the remaining 88% of the economy, where TFP 
has decelerated, despite the boom in IT investment.  The increase in computer power is seen as 
limited in its contribution to TFP because of the tension with the fixed endowment of human time.  
Meanwhile, use of the Internet in these non-durable sectors is seen as solely for market-share 
protection, recreation of old activities rather than new ones, duplicative activity and consumption on 
the job.  In this there is a major contrast with the ”golden age” from 1913-72 when there was a 
sizeable impact on productivity of inventions related to electricity, the internal combustion engine, 
chemical processes and communications/entertainment. The data in Section 3 suggests this was 
reflected in rising capital productivity throughout this period. 
 
Counter to this argument, David (1990) notes that the dynamo was an invention whose impact on 
the productivity data at a macro level was very slow to come through – with factories often 
overlaying electric equipment on old capital rather than replacing it, leading to capital deepening 
rather than TFP growth, before wholesale adoption in Gordon’s ‘golden age’.  The same could be 
true of IT.  Measurement problems may also limit contributions to productivity in official data. This 
line of reasoning suggests that the returns from the IT investment in the 1990s have yet to come.   
 
Analysing potential factors that are responsible for the recent boom in share prices Hall (2001) 
concludes that the high share prices can be justified by the recent growth in cash flow, thus 
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implicitly accepting the thesis that the earning advances are sustainable.  Hall, however, does not 
substantiate his prediction.  Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999) suggest that the rise in the stock 
market from the 1980s onwards was linked to the rise of IT based firms, arguing that “if the stock 
market provides a forecast of future events then the recent dramatic upswing represents a rosy 
estimate about growth in future profits, and this translates into a forecast of higher output and 
productivity growth, holding other things equal (such as capital’s share of income)” (p116).  
Intriguingly, Gordon (2000) notes that for capital markets the relationship between equity valuation 
and growth prospects requires much further study.  Campbell and Shiller (2001) reach similar 
conclusions.  
 
We would suggest that the large amount of research on the recent productivity advances are of little 
comfort for the earnings prospects of firms and the risk that share holders are (still) too optimistic 
about future earnings potential of firms.  First, research has focussed entirely on the effects of the IT 
revolution on TFP and labour productivity rather than capital productivity.  Second, no study has 
rigorously investigated the effects of IT investment on future earnings. Furthermore, as we show 
below, equilibrating factors in the economy suggest that advances in capital productivity and 
earnings may only be temporary. 
 
2.2.2 Tobin’s valuation ratio and the sustainability of productivity advances 
 
The debate of whether equity prices are at their fundamental value centres to a large degree on the 
expected permanent growth rate in real cash flow and hence on the term g in the Gordon model. We 
have argued in Section 2.1.1 that the best proxy for cash flow is capital productivity. In this section 
we argue that under certain assumptions capital productivity growth is zero at a macro level, which 
may implying a low level of g. This follows the predictions of Tobin’s valuation ratio model (which 
suggests that the market valuation of firms will in the long run be equal to the replacement cost of 
the capital stock).  
 
To see this consider a technology innovation that increases the productivity of capital.  The higher 
marginal productivity of capital drives the valuation ratio in excess of one because future profits per 
unit of capital is temporarily increased and this triggers investment.  The increase in the capital 
stock will lower the returns to capital due to diminishing returns to capital.  The lower cash flow per 
unit of capital will lower the valuation ratio.  Equilibrium – which may take a protracted period - is 
reached when the valuation ratio is driven back to one.  Hence, a one off productivity shock should 
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have only temporary effects on the marginal productivity of capital and hence equity returns unless 
there are constant returns to capital, as assumed in the early literature on endogenous growth 
(Romer, 1986).  However, no empirical studies have given support to the assumption of constant 
returns to capital, and later models of endogenous growth have relaxed this extreme assumption. 
 
Note the parallel to the neoclassical growth model where changes in the investment ratio (savings 
rate) have only temporary effects on growth.  In these models an increase in savings increases net 
investment and brings the capital stock up to a higher steady state level.  Growth in output is only 
temporarily higher on the transitional path from the initial equilibrium capital stock to the new 
equilibrium capital stock. 
 
There are several caveats. Tobin’s valuation ratio is only one under the assumption of perfect 
competition in the goods market and the absence of adjustment costs and uncertainty. Moreover, if 
productivity growth is continuous rather than discrete, the capital stock may never reach the point 
where the rise in marginal productivity is wholly eliminated. Both of these effects may have been in 
operation in the “golden age” referred to by Gordon (2000). We have noted that earnings growth 
may exceed capital productivity growth owing to factors such as taxes and capital market 
imperfections, as well as under differing technology than Cobb-Douglas. Nevertheless, the 
calculation suggests a need for caution in projecting productivity gains. Gordon (2000) indeed 
argues that IT investments are particularly vulnerable to diminishing returns. 
 
3 Data analysis 
 
Before turning to more formal econometric analysis, this section presents growth rates in various 
measures of productivity, share returns, real bond returns and other relevant variables in various 
periods across 9 OECD countries; the US, Germany, Canada, the UK, France, Italy, Japan, 
Denmark and Australia.  Particular attention is given to the 1920s and 1990s in which share returns 
and productivity growth rates were extraordinary high.   
 
The typical dataset available is illustrated for the US in Chart 1. The high volatility of stock returns 
is apparent, as well as a close correlation between TFP growth and economic growth. Reflecting 
rises in factor inputs, the growth in TFP is generally lower than overall economic growth. It is also 
apparent that the 1990s are by no means historically outstanding ether in terms of growth in output 
or productivity. 
  
13 
13 
 
Some long-term characteristics of the data are illustrated in the attached tables.  Table 1 shows the 
long-term arithmetic average growth rates for various measures of productivity and real returns over 
the period since 1920. TFP growth is estimated as )ln)1(lnln(100 KLY D--D-D aa , where a  is 
set to 2/3, which is approximately labour’s income share.  Concerning productivity growth, an 
immediate stylised fact is that capital productivity growth falls far short of that of labour 
productivity.  The capital stock has in effect risen much more than labour hours, with the latter 
“capturing” the benefits of productivity in terms of its marginal productivity – reflected in turn in 
growth in real labour earnings.  Total factor productivity growth, reflecting both factor inputs, lies 
between the two. 
 
Over the 80-year period considered, capital productivity growth was negative in the UK and Japan, 
and less than 1% per annum elsewhere.  Following the analysis in Section 2, there has been marked 
capital deepening, with capital/labour ratios rising strongly and TFP growth unable to compensate.  
Labour productivity growth was 1-2% in the US and Australia, 2-3% in the UK, Canada, Italy and 
Denmark, and 3-4% elsewhere.  These results suggest that in historical perspective, labour 
productivity has been substantially higher than capital productivity due to capital deepening. 
 
Real equity returns are remarkably consistent at 7-9% annually everywhere except Germany and 
Japan, where large outliers affect the latter during hyperinflation and war periods5.  Real bond 
yields are correspondingly also negative in those countries, although real yields are also negative on 
average in France and Italy.  Elsewhere they are in the range of 2-3%. Hence, the equity premium is 
5-7% on average, being the highest in the US.  In terms of GNP growth, the UK is the weakest 
performer, with average performance being below 3%, and Japan the highest at 4.6%, while 
elsewhere it lies between 3-4%.  In terms of “growth accounting”, it can be seen that total factor 
productivity accounts for a half to two-thirds of this total, with factor inputs accounting for the 
remainder.  Finally, average inflation has been around 3% in the US and Canada, 4% in the UK, 
Australia and Denmark and well in excess of that figure elsewhere. 
 
Table 2 excludes the earlier years of hyperinflation, depression and war, instead focusing on the 50-
year period from 1950 to 1999.  Patterns of productivity are little changed, although capital 
productivity growth is on average negative now for all countries expect France, Italy and Australia, 
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reflecting capital deepening.  Real equity returns are in most cases higher, and considerably so for 
Germany and Japan, reflecting post-war recovery and reconstruction.  Bond yields are consistently 
positive, while equity premia rise to 8-10% in the US, UK, Germany and Japan. Economic growth 
is again highest in Japan, but is also over 4% in Canada, Germany and Australia. The final line 
shows the well-known higher inflation in most countries in the post-war period, although exclusion 
of earlier hyperinflation makes it much lower in Germany. 
 
Table 3 displays the long-term data back to 1870, where it is available.  In Table 4 we show the 
annual correlation of real equity returns with productivity, bond yields, growth and inflation, to 
assess in a preliminary way what contemporaneous features returns link to.  Of course, since equity 
returns depend on actual and expected future dividends and there are strong cyclical elements to 
both variables, this will in no way give the “whole story”.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that 
the relation to capital productivity growth is everywhere positive, while a number of countries show 
negative correlations with labour productivity and TFP.  These results are consistent with the 
analysis in Section 2, which suggested that capital productivity is the correct productivity measure 
to use in projections of cash flow.  Real equity returns are positively related to GDP growth and real 
bond yields and negatively related to inflation, all except in the UK and (for growth) Canada. As 
shown in Table 5, some of these results fail to hold if the earlier years are excluded. 
 
Table 6 shows an estimate of annual real dividend growth since 1920 and 1950, derived from data 
on the dividend yield, share prices and the CPI. The calculations should be viewed as approximate, 
given they neglect factors such as the fact that aggregate share index and dividends only cover 
surviving firms. If a firm goes bankrupt, then it drops out of the aggregate index. This implies that 
real share returns  (capital gain + dividends) as well as dividends themselves may be overestimated.. 
It can be seen that for most countries, dividend growth has on average been rather slow, with only 
Germany and Denmark significantly exceeding 3% (we consider the Danish figure to be distorted 
by the high volatility of dividends in that country). US real dividend growth since 1920 is 2.7%, and 
only 1.7% since 1950. The growth rates of dividends fall far short of the real total returns on equity 
and economic growth (which is broadly equivalent to growth in potential output) .In some cases 
they are also below labour productivity and as expected they somewhat exceed the growth rate of 
capital productivity reflecting factors such as taxation, financial constraints and non Cobb-Douglas 
technology. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5  The data in war periods were difficult to obtain and sources conflict.  This is particularly true for the Japanese 
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Complementing the tables, we show trends on a decade-by-decade basis for the UK, US, Japan and 
Germany in Charts 2-5 (using arithmetic means) to wash out cyclical influences and noise. The US 
saw positive labour productivity and TFP growth in all decades since 1870, but negative capital 
productivity growth since the 1960s (and growth close to zero in the late 19th century) consistent 
with the Gordon (2000) discussion of a “golden age” up to the 1960s.  Average real equity returns 
(including dividends) were only negative in the 1910s; even in the 1930s and 1940s they were 
around 7%. The exceptional decades were clearly the 1920s and 1990s, with real average returns on 
equity of 17-18% – we examine these in more detail below.  Data for the UK (Chart 3) show that 
productivity has indeed been much more sluggish than in the US, with capital productivity negative 
throughout. Labour and TFP growth peaked in the 1920s and 1960s.  Finally in Germany and Japan 
a pattern of strong growth in measures of productivity is apparent after a fall in the war decade of 
the 1940s. This reached a peak in the 1950s before tailing off thereafter. This decade also witnessed 
sharp rises in share prices.  In Japan TFP growth fell continuously to near zero in the 1990s, while 
in Germany the average in the 1990s still exceeded that in the US.  Capital productivity has been 
negative since the 1960s in both countries.   
 
Finally in Charts 6-13 we focus on productivity and equity returns in specific decades – the 1920s 
and 1990s for the four countries noted above.  These decades both saw high real equity returns and 
rapid rises in productivity. Looking first at the US and the UK, the charts show that in the 1920s, 
TFP, labour and capital productivity growth rates were generally stronger than in the 1990s, while 
equity returns were comparable in the two periods.  There is a particular contrast in growth rates for 
capital productivity, which it is argued is most relevant for equity returns.  
 
As noted, the contrast between strong equity returns and falling capital productivity in the 1990s, 
while partly reflecting fundamentals such as tax effects and external finance constraints, may also 
be partly resolved by temporary or one-off factors such as the rise in capital’s share of GNP over 
the period, as well as rising borrowing of firms, share buybacks, takeovers, a decrease in the risk 
premium, higher international liquidity, changes in leverage, equity buybacks, the influence of baby 
boomers, the disinflation and “irrational exuberance” (IMF, 2000, Shiller, 2000). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
consumer prices in the mid 1940s. 
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4 Empirical estimates 
 
In Section 2 it was shown that equity prices reflect the discounted value of expected cash flow, 
which in turn should depend largely on the expected marginal productivity of capital.  Since the 
pronounced increase in equity prices in the 1990s has been partly justified by expectations of 
increasing productivity in the future, we would expect equity prices in an efficient market to be able 
to predict the marginal productivity of capital. 
 
In this section we test the causal relationship between equity prices and productivity to shed light on 
whether equity markets correctly base share valuations on the marginal productivity of capital and 
not other productivity measures; and whether capital productivities are predicted by equity prices.  
We also include some assessment of reverse causality from productivity to equity prices, while 
noting that this would imply market inefficiency. Granger causality tests are undertaken in the first 
subsection and VAR models are estimated in the second subsection. A third issue – not investigated 
in this paper - is whether there is a cointegration relation between productivity and share prices6. 
The long and eventful data period covered lends additional weight to estimation results. 
 
4.1 Granger causality tests 
 
A straightforward way to address the direct relation between productivity growth and the level of 
real share returns is to undertake Granger causality tests7.  Productivity is measured as growth in 
labour productivity, capital productivity and TFP in the tests. The Granger causality test assesses 
whether there is a consistent pattern of shifts in one variable preceding the other. Such tests do not 
give any proof on causality, but nevertheless where causal mechanisms based e.g. on expectations 
can be suggested, as outlined in Section 1, then a positive result gives grounds for further 
investigation.  
 
Granger causality can only be a starting point in empirical investigation for at least two reasons.  
First, there are a number of additional influences on equity prices, as outlined above, so a 
multivariate regression approach needs to be adopted before reaching any conclusions.  Also the 
absence of a short-term relationship may not preclude a long run link in a cointegrating framework. 
                                                 
6 Preliminary investigation using the Johansen trace test suggests that there are a range of countries where cointegration 
relations between productivity and share prices may exist. Work on cointegration will feature in a future paper. 
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To run the Granger causality test, the following equations are estimated for each country: 
 
 tttttt YYXXX ebbaaa +++++= ---- 221122110      (10) 
 
where X is either productivity growth or real equity returns and Y is the other variable in question, 
and e  is a disturbance term. If there is Granger causality from Y to X, then some of the ß 
coefficients should be non-zero; on the other hand, if not then all of the ß coefficients should be 
zero.  Testing whether the coefficients on the lagged indicator variables are zero can be readily 
performed using standard F- or t-tests. 
 
The results of the Granger causality analysis are shown in Tables 7-9, based on using two lags of 
each variable. We show whether there is significant autocorrelation in productivity growth and real 
equity returns in columns 1 and 3, before showing whether the addition of two lags in the X- 
variable can help in prediction. The signs indicate the direction of effect of the significant lags. Data 
are for 1920-1999; figures in square brackets show the outturns for the period 1950-1999. 
 
The autoregressive equations presented in columns 1 and 3 show that capital productivity growth is 
frequently positively correlated, while labour productivity growth and, to a lesser extent, TFP 
growth show negative autocorrelation in some countries. Equity returns show the well-known 
negative autocorrelation (consistent with mean reversion) in the US, Canada and the UK.  
 
The tests for Granger causality between share returns and productivity growth tend to suggest that 
share returns are often a leading indicator of productivity growth, but that productivity growth is 
very rarely a predictor of share prices.  This is of course consistent with the forward- looking nature 
of equity returns.  There are strong contrasts between the types of productivity, with real equity 
returns frequently predicting capital productivity, and to a lesser extent TFP, but very rarely 
predicting labour productivity – an interesting contrast to the focus of US analysts on labour 
productivity8. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
7 As confirmed in Section 4.2, productivity tends to be integrated of order 1, while real equity returns are stationary. 
Hence we need to difference productivity to obtain consistent results. 
8 Similar tests – not reported in detail - were run using the dividend yield, following the intuition that this may be a 
more forward looking measure of equity market sentiment than the total return (as argued inter alia by Campbell and 
Shiller 2001).  The outcome shows a more tenuous link from dividend yields to productivity growth than was the case 
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4.2 VAR systems  
 
As noted, a key problem associated with the estimation of predictive links between variables, is that 
they are almost always conditioned on the other variables incorporated in the related equation 
(Davis and Fagan, 1997).  A criticism of Granger causality tests is naturally that only two variables 
and their interrelations are assessed, while as shown in equation (9) these should only be a subset of 
the set of variables which combine to determine returns on equity.  Accordingly, we proceeded to 
wider estimation using multiple variables. We estimate a standard VAR system, which is the 
reduced form of a linear dynamic simultaneous equation model in which all variables are treated as 
endogenous.  Each variable is regressed on lagged values of itself and on lagged values of all other 
variables in the information set.  In the light of the discussion of equity price determination in 
Section 3 summarised in equation (9), we sought to assess the relation between equity returns, 
productivity, the long real bond rate, and real equity price volatility (the standard deviation of 
monthly share price changes, deflated by the CPI). These proxy the variables entering the valuation 
formula. We added to these variables the growth in GDP to allow for the influence of cyclical 
fluctuations. 
 
A preliminary to such estimation is testing for unit roots, since variables entering a VAR should 
normally be stationary.  The results of Dickey-Fuller tests are shown in Table 10.  They indicate 
that productivity growth as well as economic growth are difference stationary, as are real share 
prices and real dividends.  Share market volatility and equity returns are stationary in levels. There 
are mixed results for the real long-term interest rate and the dividend yield – we prefer on balance to 
treat these variables as also stationary in levels. 
 
We estimated VARs separately for TFP, labour productivity and capital productivity. Two lags 
were chosen, as this tends to minimise the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. The aim is to 
provide some quantitative estimates of the relationship between productivity, equity returns and 
related variables.  To do this we need to orthogonalise the estimated VAR model - which is in 
reduced form - to identify the effect of shocks to the innovations of the variables in the VAR.  The 
problems of identifying impulse responses in VAR models now arise.  We have treated this by 
adopting a standard approach, using a Choleski decomposition.  Identification then uses the Sims’s 
triangular ordering.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
for equity returns.  There are very few cases where dividend yields help to predict productivity growth, and virtually 
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A well-known problem with the Sims triangular ordering is that it is arbitrary, and requires a 
justification for the ordering chosen. The presence of common shocks and co-movements among 
the variables makes the decision on ordering a crucial one.  We decided, in line with Canova and De 
Nicolo (1995) and Nasseh and Straus (2000) to assume that exogenous shocks are largely 
technology driven and hence affect productivity and output. Stock returns, in line with the present 
value model, respond according to the effect of these shocks on future cash flow.  Stock returns 
may also respond to changes in inflation, long term real rates (discount factor) and volatility (risk 
premium), which may all also be affected by technological factors.  Hence, we order the variables 
with productivity first, followed by output growth, inflation, long rates and real equity price 
volatility before equity returns themselves.  Equity returns are thus constrained to only feed back on 
the other variables with a lag. 
 
With a model of this sort there is a large amount of output generated by this exercise: six equations, 
subject to six different shocks gives 36 solutions.  So we have selected a few representative and key 
results for presentation.  Given the focus of the work on equity returns and productivity, we report 
only the variance decomposition of equity returns to shocks in the innovations to variables in the 
VAR, and of productivity to equity returns, together with selected impulse responses.  
 
The results for variance decompositions in the VARs are shown in Tables 11-13. These show the 
degree to which the variance of the “independent variables” explain the forecast variance of the 
“target” variable in the VAR system, in the light of which one may interpret the response of the 
system to shocks.  There are some interesting cross-country contrasts. In the United States, equity 
returns have a strong element of autocorrelation, with errors in equity returns helping to explain 
forecast errors in the same variable.  This is arguably consistent with an efficient market and 
random walk process.  The strongest effect otherwise is from price inflation, and to a lesser extent 
the real long rate. Lagged productivity has little effect on equity prices, in line with market 
efficiency; TFP is shown to be a better “indicator” of equity returns than capital or labour 
productivity. There is a strong feedback effect of equity returns on capital productivity, amounting 
to 15% of the forecast variance after 4 years, suggesting forward looking behaviour by equity 
holders, which is absent for TFP and labour productivity. Australia and Canada closely resemble the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
none where productivity helps to predict the yield. 
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US results in virtually all respects, except capital productivity is the best indicator of equity returns 
in Canada, and equity price volatility is more influential in both countries than the US. 
 
A polar opposite result is in Japan and Germany, where the own-effect on forecast variance of stock 
returns is much lower, and a substantial part of the forecast variance of equity returns is explained 
by lagged capital productivity and (to a lesser extent) TFP and labour productivity. This may of 
course relate to the lesser development of equity markets (only responding in the wake of actual real 
developments, rather than in line with expectations), as well as the strong post war growth in 
productivity highlighted in Section 4.  Equity price volatility also plays a role in both countries, 
while inflation is important in Japan (this may reflect relatively high inflation during the high-
growth period up to 1973).  In neither of these countries is there strong feedback from equity returns 
to productivity, again suggesting that there are limited forward looking signals from financial asset 
prices to real activity.  Italy and to a lesser extent France also have a substantial impact of 
productivity on equity returns – the main difference with Germany and Japan is in a more 
substantial feedback effect in Italy and effect of GDP in France. 
 
Of the remaining countries, the forecast variance of equity returns in the UK is strongly influenced 
by the real long rate and equity price volatility – real economy variables have much less impact. 
The same comment applies to the real long rate in Denmark. In neither country do shocks to 
productivity or equity prices show a significant interrelation. 
 
Table 14 shows the impulse responses to certain shocks, which are highlighted by the variance 
decomposition analysis.  First there are effects of shocks in capital productivity on equity returns in 
Germany, Japan, Italy and France. They in each case generate a rise in equity returns, which is 
sizeable in the case of Japan and more modest in the other countries. The overall effect after 6 years 
is positive except in France. On the other hand, a rise in equity returns tends in the medium term to 
depress capital productivity in the US and Canada, as well as initially in Italy. This is consistent 
with either cyclical patterns or a valuation ratio effect whereby high equity returns prompt increased 
investment, which given diminishing marginal productivity of capital leads to lower capital 
productivity. 
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6. Conclusions  
 
The share market boom in the 1990s is often linked to the accelerating labour productivity over the 
same period. We have suggested that labour productivity may be a misleading measure of firm’s 
cash flow and that innovations in productivity in the 1990s only have temporary effects on capital 
productivity, the key component of a more correct measure of cash flow. Among the empirical 
findings are that the overall performance of the major OECD countries since the 1920s is broadly 
similar both in terms of productivity and equity returns.  The 1990s have featured relatively low 
productivity growth compared to the 1920s, with a great deal of reliance on capital deepening, 
suggesting a weak background for equity price increases in the 1990s. Of the three measures of 
productivity, equity returns seem to be most strongly related to capital productivity. VARs suggest 
that there may be effects of equity returns on productivity in the US, Australia and Canada, which 
may link to the effects of higher returns on investment. There is less evidence that shocks to 
productivity consistently help to predict equity returns in these countries. For Germany, Japan and 
Italy there is evidence of an opposite effect, with productivity shocks helping explain the forecast 
variance of equity returns. This may link to the period of post-war recovery in these countries, when 
investment and productivity growth were strong, but equity markets were rather underdeveloped. 
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Chart 1: US growth, stock returns and productivity (TFP)
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Chart 2: US productivity and 
real equity returns by decades
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Chart 3: UK productivity and 
real equity returns by decades
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Chart 4: Japanese productivity 
and real equity returns by 
decades
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Chart 5: German productivity 
and real equity returns by 
decades
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Chart 6: US productivity and real 
equity returns in 1920s
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Chart 7: US productivity and real 
equity returns in 1990s
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Chart 8: UK productivity and 
real equity returns in 1920s
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Chart 9: UK productivity and real 
equity returns in 1990s
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Chart 10: German productivity 
and real equity returns in 1920s
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Chart 11: German productivity 
and real equity returns in 1990s
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Chart 12: Japanese productivity 
and real equity returns in 1920s
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Chart 13: Japanese productivity 
and real equity returns in 1990s
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Table 1: Long term averages for annual productivity growth and real equity returns (1920-99) 
 
Percent per annum US UK Canada Ger-
many 
France Italy Japan Aust-
ralia 
Den-
mark 
Labour productivity 1.65 2.10 2.16 3.91 3.25 2.51 4.06 1.79 2.22 
Capital productivity 0.83 -0.70 0.10 0.81 0.94 0.27 -0.60 0.37 0.18 
Total factor 
productivity 
1.61 1.09 1.55 2.54 2.34 1.79 2.37 1.32 1.55 
Real equity returns 9.79 9.06 7.50 -129.01 6.90 7.15 2.57 7.58 7.85 
Memo: Real bond 
yields 
2.24 2.66 3.22 -140.70 -2.83 -2.87 -6.98 2.3 3.48 
Memo: Growth 3.16 2.15 3.82 3.80 3.32 3.03 4.62 3.49 2.99 
Memo: Inflation 3.00 4.01 2.96 147.03 9.31 10.24 12.94 4.42 4.01 
 
Table 2: Post-war averages for annual productivity growth and equity returns (1950-99)) 
 
Percent per annum US UK Canada Ger-
many 
France Italy Japan Aust-
ralia 
Den-
mark 
Labour productivity 1.50 2.31 2.06 4.26 3.38 3.50 5.29 2.07 2.62 
Capital productivity -0.09 -0.93 -0.39 -0.34 0.54 0.56 -0.63 0.28 -0.29 
Total factor 
productivity 
1.41 1.15 1.45 2.70 2.51 2.45 3.29 1.59 1.73 
Real equity returns 10.25 11.23 7.84 12.85 8.50 8.37 12.94 6.09 9.47 
Memo: Real bond 
yields 
2.45 2.64 3.30 4.29 2.15 2.40 2.11 2.09 3.75 
Memo: Growth 3.26 2.51 4.11 4.10 3.70 3.83 6.12 4.04 3.09 
Memo: Inflation 3.42 4.92 3.44 2.45 9.25 12.51 15.21 4.75 4.79 
 
Table 3: Secular averages (1870-1999) 
 
Percent per annum US UK Canada Ger-
many 
France Italy Japan Aust-
ralia 
Den-
mark 
Labour productivity 2.01 1.53 2.21    NA 2.21 3.52 1.42 2.27 
Capital productivity 0.78 -0.71 -0.37 0.10 0.17 0.40 NA -0.53 0.29 
Total factor 
productivity 
1.71 0.71 1.26 1.61  NA 1.60 NA 0.66 1.60 
Real equity returns 8.69     -79.79           
Memo: Real bond 
yields 
2.38 2.20 2.19 -87.24   -2.76   2.55 3.09 
Memo: Growth 3.50 1.99 3.80 3.07 2.42 2.47 4.00 3.31 2.80 
Memo: Inflation 2.15 3.11 2.32 92.68   7.65   3.15 3.08 
 
Table 4: Annual correlation of real equity returns (1920-1999) 
 
Percent per annum US UK Canada Ger-
many 
France Italy Japan Aust-
ralia 
Den-
mark 
Labour productivity 0.09 -0.05 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.31 -0.32 0.03 0.12 
Capital productivity 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.43 0.01 0.09 0.15 
Total factor 
productivity 
0.17 0.04 0.00 0.23 -0.03 0.39 -0.02 0.21 0.13 
Memo: Real bond 
yields 
0.30 -0.07 0.15 0.99 0.10 0.48 0.9 0.2 0.17 
Memo: Growth 0.09 -0.04 -0.10 0.26 0.04 0.40 0.11 0.05 0.08 
Memo: Inflation -0.33 0.09 -0.28 -1.00 -0.12 -0.50 -0.90 -0.30 -0.10 
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Table 5: Annual correlation of real equity returns (1950-1999) 
 
 US UK Canada Ger-
many 
France Italy Japan Aust-
ralia 
Den-
mark 
Labour productivity 0.12 -0.14 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.26 0.06 0.11 
Capital productivity -0.07 -0.03 0.16 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.56 0.19 0.15 
Total factor 
productivity 
0.15 0.04 -0.01 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.41 0.39 0.10 
Memo: Real bond 
yields 
0.27 -0.19 0.07 -0.05. 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.16 
Memo: Growth -0.08 -0.12 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.37 0.13 -0.01 
Memo: Inflation -0.39 0.07 -0.24 -0.16 -0.12 -0.22 -0.18 -0.25 -0.12 
 
Table 6: Growth rate of real dividends  
 
Percent per annum US UK Canada Ger-
many 
France Italy Japan Aust-
ralia 
Den-
mark 
1920-1999 2.6 1.2 0.5 4.9 2.6 2.7 -0.3 1.7 11.2 
1950-1999 1.7 1.7 0.2 6.7 3.2 1.2 2.2 1.1 16.4 
Memo: growth rate of 
real capital stock 
1920-1999 2.35 2.89 3.75 2.96 2.38 2.73 5.30 3.13 2.82 
1950-1999 3.36 3.49 4.52 4.46 3.14 3.26 6.84 3.75 3.41 
 
 
Table 7: Granger causality tests for real equity returns and capital productivity 
 
Country Capital 
productivity 
Real equity 
returns on capital 
productivity 
Real equity 
returns 
Capital 
productivity on 
real equity returns 
US + [0] + [+] - [0} 0 [0] 
Germany + [+] - [+] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Canada 0 [0] - [+] - [-] 0 [0] 
UK + [+] 0 [+] - [-] 0 [0] 
France + [+] 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Italy + [0] - [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Japan 0 [+] 0 [-] 0 [0] + [0] 
Denmark 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Australia = [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] - [-] 
 
 
Table 8: Granger causality tests for real equity returns and labour productivity 
 
Country Labour 
productivity 
Real equity 
returns on labour 
productivity 
Real equity 
returns 
Labour 
productivity on 
real equity returns 
US - [-] 0 [0] - [0} 0 [0] 
Germany - [+] 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Canada 0 [0] 0 [0] - [-] 0 [0] 
UK 0 [0] 0 [0] - [-] 0 [0] 
France + [+] - [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Italy 0 [+] - [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Japan 0 [+] 0 [0] 0 [0] + [0] 
Denmark 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Australia - [-] 0 [0] 0 [0] - [-] 
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Table 9: Granger causality tests for real equity returns and total factor productivity 
 
Country Total factor 
productivity 
Real equity 
returns on total 
factor 
productivity 
Real equity 
returns 
Total factor 
productivity on 
real equity returns 
US 0 [+] + [+] - [0} 0 [0] 
Germany + [+] - [+] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Canada 0 [0] 0 [0] - [-] 0 [0] 
UK 0 [0] 0 [0] - [-] 0 [0] 
France 0 [+] 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Italy + [0] - [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Japan 0 [+] - [0] 0 [0] + [0] 
Denmark - [-] 0 [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] 
Australia - [0] 0 [0] 0 [0] - [-] 
 
Table 10: Unit root (DF) tests (* indicates stationarity at the 95% level) 
 
 US DE CA UK FR IT JP DK AU 
RLR -2.1 -4.0* -2.7 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 -4.1* -3.5* -2.6 
DRLR -5.3* -5.7* -5.1* -3.7* -4.8* -4.8* -5.3* -6.3* -5.8* 
EQR -4.9* -6.0* -4.3* -4.9* -3.7* -4.5* -4.6* -5.4* -2.3 
DY -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 -3.7* -2.1 -3.6* -2.4 -2.5 -2.7 
SP -2.0 -3.0 -2.4 -2.1 -2.0 -2.2 -2.2 -0.9 -3.0 
DSP -4.7* -6.4* -4.3* -6.1* -5.3* -4.4* -4.4* -5.5* -5.2* 
RDIV -3.2 -2.9 -1.9 -3.4 -2.3 -2.4 -2.4 -3.9* -2.8 
DRDIV -5.7* -4.0* -4.4* -4.7* -3.4 -4.3* -4.3* -3.7* -3.8* 
CPI -3.1 -4.0* -2.3 -2.3 -2.2 -2.8 -1.7 -1.7 -2.4 
DCPI -2.0 -4.3* -1.8 -2.4 -2.9 -2.9 -4.2* -2.6 -2.7 
VOL -3.6* -3.2 -3.9* -3.9* -3.2 -4.1* -3.9* -4.3* -4.3* 
DLP -4.2* -4.5* -4.3* -4.9* -4.0* -1.9 -3.6* -3.8* -4.4* 
DTFP -3.8* -3.9* -5.0* -5.0* -4.1* -2.1 -4.7* -4.8* -5.0* 
DKP -3.6* -5.4* -5.1* -4.6* -4.3* -4.3* -4.7* -4.6* -3.1 
GDP -2.0 -3.0 -2.0 -3.5* -2.6 -2.3 -2.0 -1.6 -1.8 
DGDP -3.7* -4.7* -4.4* -5.2* -3.9* -3.9* -4.4* -4.9* -3.2 
Key: RLR=real long rate, EQR, real total return on equity, DY dividend yield, SP share price index, RDIV real 
dividend index, CPI consumer price index, VOL share price volatility, TFP total factor productivity, KP capital 
productivity, LP labour productivity, a “D” before the variable name indicates first difference. 
 
Table 11: Variance decompositions for stock returns, using TFP  
 
Variable Years US DE CA UK FR IT JP DK AU 
DTFP  1 4 1 0 2 0 14 0 5 7 
 4 5 8 0 2 7 13 58 7 8 
DGDP 1 0 2 2 1 3 4 0 1 2 
 4 2 10 6 3 5 5 11 2 4 
DCPI 1 7 2 1 1 0 0 29 3 1 
 4 7 2 6 1 2 7 9 3 2 
RLR 1 4 0 7 40 10 0 9 30 5 
 4 5 4 6 37 10 1 8 36 4 
VOL 1 1 2 4 5 0 0 10 4 2 
 4 3 12 8 19 0 6 3 5 5 
EQR 1 84 93 86 52 86 83 52 59 84 
 4 77 65 73 38 76 68 11 48 76 
Memo:           
EQR on 
DTFP 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 4 1 0 2 0 3 15 1 4 3 
  
30 
30 
Table 12: Variance decompositions for stock returns, using capital productivity 
 
Variable Years US DE CA UK FR IT JP DK AU 
DKP  1 1 3 4 0 4 22 1 4 1 
 4 2 21 5 2 12 20 67 6 2 
DGDP 1 1 2 0 1 9 0 15 10 3 
 4 1 3 2 3 13 3 6 10 5 
DCPI 1 13 4 0 6 3 2 18 0 2 
 4 12 3 4 5 3 10 6 2 3 
RLR 1 3 0 9 33 1 1 6 27 6 
 4 4 3 7 32 2 1 5 33 6 
VOL 1 1 3 6 5 1 4 8 3 2 
 4 3 10 8 20 1 8 5 3 4 
EQR 1 81 88 81 55 81 72 51 55 87 
 4 77 60 73 40 69 58 10 46 80 
Memo:           
EQR on 
DKP 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 4 15 1 10 1 1 13 3 3 5 
 
Table 13: Variance decompositions for stock returns, using labour productivity 
 
Variable Years US DE CA UK FR IT JP DK AU 
DKP  1 1 1 1 0 0 7 0 5 2 
 4 4 12 1 1 5 7 38 11 6 
DGDP 1 2 3 5 0 0 13 0 0 1 
 4 3 6 7 4 6 14 34 3 3 
DCPI 1 7 2 0 3 0 0 24 1 4 
 4 7 2 5 2 2 7 7 2 4 
RLR 1 4 0 6 35 7 0 7 29 4 
 4 5 4 5 33 7 1 3 35 5 
VOL 1 1 1 3 5 0 0 5 4 1 
 4 2 13 6 19 0 5 4 5 3 
EQR 1 85 94 84 54 92 79 63 59 87 
 4 78 63 75 39 79 64 14 45 78 
Memo:           
EQR on 
DKP 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 4 0 1 1 0 9 11 13 3 1 
 
 
Table 14: Impulse response functions for selected variables (responses to 1% shocks in other variables) 
 
Year  1 2 3 4 5 6 
DKP on 
EQR 
      
JP -2 55 11 4 5 -6 
DE 4 -5 12 0 -1 -5 
IT 16 1 5 4 -1 1 
FR 8 -10 -6 -1 -1 0 
       
EQR on 
DKP 
      
US 0 1.4 -1 -1.5 -0.6 -0.3 
CA 0 0 -1 -0.8 0 -0.2 
IT 0 -1.2 -0.2 1.7 0.4 0 
 
